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FROM THE EDITOR
WHY WE NEED A THEORY OF STAKEHOLDER
GOVERNANCE—AND WHY THIS IS A HARD PROBLEM
“There is nothing more powerful than an idea whose
time has come.”
―Victor Hugo, Les Misérables
Corporate governance is an important topic for both
scholars and practicing managers. To date, most work
on this subject has focused on how to resolve potential
conflicts of interest between a firm’s senior managers
and its shareholders in how firms create and distribute
economic value. This work, based in agency theory
(Alchian&Demsetz,1972; Jensen&Meckling,1976),has
led to the design of a variety of corporate governance
mechanisms that have been widely implemented by
many firmsaroundtheworld (Aguilera& Jackson,2003;
Williamson, 1996). These mechanisms include incen-
tive programs for senior managers—such as CEO com-
pensation in the form of stock and stock options based
on firm performance—that act as management “bond-
ing” devices (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), and a variety
of disciplinary mechanisms—such as the inclusion of
“outsiders”onboardsof directors and legallymandated
reporting requirements—that increase the ability of
shareholders to “monitor” the performance of a firm
(Fama & Jensen, 1983).
Work on using governance to resolve possible con-
flicts between senior managers and shareholders has
largely developed separately from governance ques-
tions focused on the broader relationships between
a firm and its multiple stakeholders (Donaldson &
Preston,1995;Freeman,1984).This is ironic sincesome
of the earliest work on agency theory conceptualized a
firm as “a nexus for a set of contracting relationships
among individuals” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 310).
These individuals, including “individuals” as legal fic-
tions, can be viewed as a firm’s stakeholders. However,
instead of examining how governance could enable a
firm to work with all of its stakeholders in creating and
distributing economic value, agency theorists have
mostly focused on governing the relationship between
managers and only a single stakeholder: shareholders.
An ideawhose timehas come is that of considering
more directly the governance of relations between a
firm and its multiple stakeholders and not just with
its shareholders. This will necessitate broadening
the conceptualization of the value created by a firm
beyond simply shareholder return (Barney, 2018;
McGahan, 2020), a requirement accentuated by the
recent COVID-19 public health crisis (Carney, 2020).
However, on the face of it, the analysis of
stakeholder governance seems likely to be a more
difficult problem than the governance of manager–
shareholder relations. Theories of shareholder gov-
ernance focus on how economic value is created by
and distributed between two groups—shareholders
and senior managers—that are relatively homoge-
nous with respect to their (sometimes)-conflicting
interests regarding how they would like to see a firm
managed (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Governance
mechanisms designed to reconcile these potential
conflicts are relatively straightforward to formulate,
although not always easy to implement (Baysinger &
Butler, 1985; Tihanyi, Graffin, & George, 2014).
Stakeholder governance, however, must deal with
much broader relationships between a firm and its
multiple stakeholder groups (Freeman, 1984) and the
associated creation and distribution of value across
them. Conventional corporate finance suggests that,
with perfect factor markets, a firm that maximizes the
wealth of its shareholders as its sole residual claimants
will correspondingly maximize the economic value of
the firm (Jensen, 2001).However, this isnot the case in a
world of incomplete contracting and strategic factor
markets: maximizing shareholder wealth does not nec-
essarily address the conflicting economic interests of
shareholders, employees, suppliers, and other stake-
holders, and thus does not necessarily maximize the
value of the firm (Barney, 1986, 2018; Klein, Mahoney,
McGahan, & Pitelis, 2012; Zingales, 2000).
Moreover, while shareholder governance has pri-
marily focused on economic returns, stakeholders can
have interests that go well beyond narrow economic
concerns (Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012; Carney,
2020; McGahan, 2020). Employees, for example, are
likely to be concerned about appropriating some of the
economic profits their human capital helps to create
(Morris, Alvarez, Barney, &Molloy, 2017), butmay also
have interests in personal health (Michel, 2011), work
life quality (Lambert, 2000), internal and external pay
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equity (Buttner & Lowe, 2017), and employment sta-
bility (Failla, Melillo, & Reichstein, 2017). Customers
generallywant topurchase thehighest-qualityproducts
at the lowestpricepossible (Gale&Rosenthal,1994),but
may also have concerns about exploiting child labor in
developing countries (Eden, 2003), a firm’s impact on
global climate change (Wright &Nyberg, 2017),modern
slavery (Crane, 2013; Phung & Crane, 2018), and rising
economic and social inequality (Amis, Mair, & Munir,
2020; Bapuji, Husted, Lu, & Mir, 2018). The communi-
tieswithinwhicha firmoperateswillbe interested in the
employment opportunities and taxes that can be gener-
ated by a firm in their midst, but might also be alarmed
by environmental pollution (Howard-Grenville, Buckle,
Hoskins, & George, 2014), traffic congestion (Verhoef,
2010), and urban sprawl (Nechyba &Walsh, 2004).
Milton Friedman (1962: 133) maintained that “the
one andonly obligation of business is tomaximize its
profits while engaging in open and free competition
without deception or fraud.” Many scholars have
subsequently argued that firms can safely ignore the
noneconomic interests of their stakeholders when
making business decisions (e.g., Black & Kraakman,
1996). Some have suggested that these noneconomic
issues can be better managed through political pro-
cesses, andarenot part of a firm’s sphereof operations.1
However, not only may failing to attend to stakeholder
economic interests result in firm value loss (Connelly,
Haynes, Tihanyi, Gamache, & Devers, 2016; Cuypers,
Koh, & Wang, 2016), there is also increasing evidence
thatoverlookingnoneconomic interestsof stakeholders
often leads to negative financial consequences for firms
(Richard, 2000; Shan, Fu, & Zheng, 2017). Focusing on
maximizing shareholder wealth, the conventional cor-
porate governance model, is incapable of addressing
the conflicting economic interests of a firm’s stake-
holders, let alone their noneconomic interests.
Developing a theory of stakeholder governance
that explains how firms can reconcile the conflicting
economic and noneconomic interests of its multiple
stakeholders is a hard problem. However, this is the
governance problem that senior managers currently
face, a reality reaffirmed by the recent announcement
by181CEOsassociatedwith theBusinessRoundtable
(2019) that theywill now focus on addressing broader
stakeholder interests instead of just maximizing the
wealth of shareholders.
Our brief essay cannot hope to propose a general
answer to this stakeholder governance question, but
we hope to accomplish two things: first, we want to
call attention to the problem, and, second, we would
like to suggest some possible approaches to address-
ing it. In this spirit, here are some, but certainly
not all, possibleways to begin to think about a revised
theory of stakeholder governance:
• Stakeholder governance as a bargaining game
among stakeholders. One approach might be to
think of stakeholder governance as an outcome of
multilateral bargaining among stakeholders that
have conflicting economic and noneconomic in-
terests. Bargaining could be simultaneous, such as
when the interests of stakeholders are reconciled in a
single negotiation (Krishna & Serrano, 1996), or ex-
tended over a period of time, as in a series of bilateral
negotiations in which stakeholders A and B strike a
deal, then stakeholders B and C strike a deal that is
consistent with B’s deal with A, then stakeholders C
and D strike a deal that is consistent with C’s deal
with B and B’s deal with A, and so on (Machlup &
Taber, 1960).
• Stakeholder governance as creating forumswhere
conflicts among stakeholders can be addressed.
Blair and Stout (1999) focused on how firms can
create forums within which stakeholder negotia-
tions take place. In this context, they maintained
that an independent boardof directors could act as
trustees of the diverse stakeholders of a corpora-
tion. This mediating hierarchy provides a vehicle
through which publicly traded corporations can
formulate strategies that protect firm-specific
investments and increase the joint welfare of a
firm’s multiple stakeholders (Hoskisson, Gambeta,
Green, & Li, 2018; Klein et al., 2012; Wang, He, &
Mahoney, 2009).
• Stakeholder governance through establishing pri-
orities among different stakeholders. McGahan
(2020) has pointed to the need to identify which
stakeholders should be of concern to a firm. In
making such judgements, firm leaders will also be
faced with having to prioritize the interests of
some of its stakeholders over others, based on
managerial judgment or some guiding principle
such as variations in stakeholders’ power, legiti-
macy, or urgency (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).
For example, firmsmay choose to give precedence
to the interests of stakeholders that provide
profit-generating resources over stakeholders that
provide generic resources (Barney, 2018). In addition,
firms could make these priorities widely known by
signaling (Spence, 1974) their willingness to address
the interests of some stakeholders over others. These
1 An assertion contradicted by the political activities of
many firms (Barley, 2010; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004;
Sampson, 1973).
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actions could address the stakeholder governance
problem by attracting stakeholders, including
shareholders, who prefer working with a firm
with particular (signaled) stakeholder priori-
ties (Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2007; Morris
et al., 2017). In this setting,managers would focus
on addressing the interests of their highest-priority
stakeholders while still maintaining a level of
satisfaction among lower priority stakeholders
such that they continue to engage with the firm
(Barney, 2018; Simon, 1952).
• Stakeholder governance as a process of finding
ways to resolve stakeholder conflicts. Finally,
perhaps there is no general theory for resolving
conflicting interests among a firm’s stakeholders
(Barnard, 1938/1968; Follett, Fox, & Urwick,
1940; Miller, 1992; Nickerson & Zenger, 2002).
Instead, maybe all that can be developed is a
framework for a process by which managers in
firms can create ways to resolve these conflicts in
their “particular circumstances of time and place”
(Hayek, 1945: 521). This process frameworkwould
be, at its core, entrepreneurial in nature, as a supe-
rior governance outcomemay not be known before
the process unfolded (Alvarez & Barney, 2007).
That some managers might be more skilled at
this than others suggests that stakeholder gover-
nance could be a source of a firm’s competitive
advantage (Barney, 1991; Klein et al., 2012).
These are only four possible approaches to think-
ing about the stakeholder governance problem; they
are neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaus-
tive. What is apparent is that the need to reconsider
how we theorize, teach, and practice stakeholder
governance is compelling and pressing. Depending on
the outcome, a theory of stakeholder governance could
be among the most important theoretical—and deeply
practical—contributions to the field of management
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